The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking by Heldt, Birger
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
Volume 2 Issue 1 
April 2013 
The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking 
Birger Heldt 
Folke Bernadotte Academy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia 
 Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, 
International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law 
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and 




2 Penn St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. 9 (2013). 
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and 
School of International Affairs. 
 Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 




THE LACK OF COORDINATION IN 
DIPLOMATIC PEACEMAKING 
Birger Heldt* 
As often observed in recent studies on peacemaking, there 
has been a shift from a few high-profile mediators to the present 
situation, characterized by states, ad-hoc groups of states and inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs) (Track I diplomacy) as well as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local organizations and 
prominent figures (Track II diplomacy). The origin of this shift may 
be traced back to the early 1990s when the United Nations initiated 
efforts to increase and coordinate the contributions of regional 
arrangements for addressing threats to international peace and 
security.1 One alleged impetus for the change was the United 
                                                 
* Birger Heldt, Director of Research, Folke Bernadotte Academy, 
Sweden. 
1 See Jochen Prantl, Informal Groups of States and the UN Security Council, 59 
INT’L ORG. 559, 561, 584 (2005); Birger Heldt, Trends from 1948-2005: How to View 
the Relation between the United Nations and Non-UN Entities, in PEACE OPERATIONS: 
TRENDS, PROGRESS, AND PROSPECTS 9 (Donald C.F. Daniel et al. eds., 2008); 
Hikaru Yamashita, Peacekeeping Cooperation Between the United Nations and Regional 
Organisations, 38 REV. INT’L STUD. 165, 167, 171 (2010); accord U.N. Secretary-
General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping: Rep. of 
the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. A/47/277-S/24111 (June 17, 1992) http://www.un-
documents.net/a47-277.htm (highlighting prevention); U.N. Secretary-General, 
Secretary-General Says Global Effort Against Armed Conflict Needs Change from “Culture of 
Reaction to Culture of Prevention”, U.N. PRESS RELEASE SC/6759 (Nov. 29, 1999) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19991129.sc6759.doc.html; U.N. 
Secretary-General, Prevention of Armed Conflict: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. DOC. 
A/55/985–S/2001/574 (June 7, 2001), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/ 
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/CPR%20S%202001 
%20574.pdf, (devotes an entire report, for the first time, to the broad topic of 
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Nation’s perceived inability to cope with the demand for 
peacekeeping and peacemaking in the immediate aftermath of the 
Cold War.2 The increase in peacemaking actors may also be a 
consequence of the expanded space for third-party initiatives as Cold 
War rivalries ended. Regardless of the cause, this development 
conforms with Article 52 of the U.N. Charter, which encourages 
peace initiatives from regional actors as the first resort before cases 
are referred to the U.N., which should be the last resort.3 
The increased number of peacemaking actors coincides with 
“a five-fold increase in the number of diplomatic interventions” in 
conflicts (both protracted and emerging) in the 1990s, as compared 
to the 1980s.4 Similarly, the number of U.N. peacemaking initiatives 
increased by approximately forty percent during 2000-2003 as 
compared with the 1990s, and fivefold between 1989 and 2002.5 
Furthermore, peacemaking initiatives of so-called Groups of Friends 
(small ad-hoc groupings of states and IGOs) increased seven-fold 
between 1991 and 2006.6 Moreover, between 1993 and 2004, there 
were 550 third-party peacemaking initiatives (mediation, third-party-
moderated direct talks, and good offices) in emerging conflicts alone.7 
                                                 
conflict prevention); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on Enhancing 
Mediation and its Support Activities, U.N. DOC. S/2009/189 (Apr. 8, 2009),  available at 
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/sgrep09.htm, (discussing mediation); U.N. Secretary-
General, Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results: Rep. of the Secretary-General,. U.N. DOC. 
S/2011/552 (Aug. 26, 2011), http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/ 
files/SG Report_PreventiveDiplomacy_S2011552(english)_1.pdf, (summarizing 
the narrower topic of preventive diplomacy); BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, 
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AT THE UN (2008) (providing a detailed account of 
preventive diplomacy and peacemaking by the U.N.). 
2 See Prantl, supra note 1, at 561. 
3 U.N. Charter art. 52, para. 2 (“[M]ake every effort to achieve pacific 
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional 
agencies before referring them to the Security Council.”), http://www.un.org/ 
en/documents/charter/chapter8.shtml.  
4   HUMAN SECURITY REPORT PROJECT, HUMAN SECURITY REPORT 
2009/2010: THE CAUSES OF PEACE AND THE SHRINKING COSTS OF WAR 6, 63 
(2011) [hereafter SECURITY] http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-
reports/20092010/overview.aspx. 
5   Id. at 67. 
6   Id. 
7   FRIDA MÖLLER, CODEBOOK FOR THE DATASET MANAGING 
INTRASTATE LOW-LEVEL CONFLICT (MILC) (2007) (for data and detailed dataset 
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The increased amount of peacemaking, however, is accompanied by a 
low success rate. On average, there were 31 peacemaking attempts 
for every agreement in emerging civil conflicts from 1993 to 2004, 
and only fifteen percent of these conflicts ended through an 
agreement (as compared to the other outcomes of victory, low 
activity or escalation to war).8 
This article focuses on recent emerging9 conflicts, and 
assesses whether peacemaking has been characterized by 
coordination. The second section examines empirical patterns and 
their consequences. The third section is an attempt to formulate 
policy implications that touch upon the role of regional organisations, 
a pre-determined division of labour, and the importance of having a 
long-term peacemaking strategy. The focus of this analysis should not 
diminish efforts to deal with another problem: the general inaction 
on the part of the international community in responding to the large 
majority of emerging conflicts may be a bigger problem than the 
over-attention suffered by a few cases. 
MUCH PEACEMAKING, BUT LITTLE COORDINATION 
Peacemaking is prevalent, but is often not coordinated with 
regard to choice of tools (mediation, etc.), the agenda or the issues of 
the talks. This lack of coordination has for many years been 
recognized as detrimental. It allows conflict parties to “shop around,” 
wait for better deals, play the third parties against one another in 
search of a better deal, or sabotage peacemaking attempts.10 This 
                                                 
on peacemaking); Birger Heldt, Sequencing of Peacemaking: A Pilot Study (July 17, 
2012) (unpublished paper) (source of the number of peacemaking initiatives, which 
builds on data found in Möller). “Good office” refers to instances where third 
parties facilitate talks by offering conflict parties a venue to meet and communicate 
directly, but do not actively engage in, or moderate, the talks.  
8 Heldt, supra note 7. 
9 As used here “emerging” is defined as a conflict that has resulted in at 
least 25—but less than 1,000—deaths per year. 
10See generally Birger Heldt, Preventive Diplomacy in Emerging Intrastate Conflicts: 
Some Historical Patterns, in THIRD PARTIES AND CONFLICT PREVENTION 210 
(Anders Mellbourn ed., 2008); Tobias Böhmelt, Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact 
of Multiparty Mediation, 41 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 859 (2011); U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. 
of the Secretary-General on Enhancing Mediation and its Support Activities, U.N. Doc. 
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insight is corroborated by statistical findings that indicate a negative 
relationship between the number of involved third parties and the 
likelihood of reaching a negotiated agreement in terms of ceasefires, 
partial or full peace agreements that halt the violence.11 A study of the 
size of Group of Friends mechanisms—most of which were applied 
on protracted instead of emerging conflicts—makes a similar 
observation: the larger the size of a Group of Friends, the less 
consistent the action.12 Coordination is thus very difficult, even when 
coordination mechanisms are in place. 
One example, among the worst cases in this regard, is the 
conflict between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the insurgent Croat 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. From October to December of 
1993 a plethora of Track I and Track II actors attempted to resolve 
the conflict. Mediation (M), third-party moderated direct talks (D) 
and good offices (G) were initiated in the following sequence: D, D, 
G, D, G, G, D, M, D, G, D, D, G, G, G, M, D, G, G, M, G, G, 
M.”13 Equally disorderly was the sequence of issues discussed, in 
terms of how the talks moved back and forth between basic 
incompatibility (government power or independence/autonomy), 
behavior (ceasefires, withdrawal of troops, etc.), and other issues 
(refugees, talks about talks, etc.).14 
It is in this particular case difficult to discern a strategy or 
straight trajectory; rather it appears that everything is tried and retried 
at some point. For instance, it may make sense to start off with 
                                                 
S/2009/189 (April 8, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
49e6f2880.html; Teresa Whitfield, Orchestrating International Action, 19 ACCORD 18 
(2008), http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord%2019_4Orchestrating%20 
international%20action_2008_ENG.pdf.  
11 Böhmelt, supra note 10; Heldt, supra note 10; David Cunningham, Veto 
Players and Civil War Duration, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 875, 877, 879 (2006). 
12 TERESA WHITFIELD, FRIENDS INDEED? THE UNITED NATIONS, 
GROUPS OF FRIENDS, AND THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 270, 280 (2007). 
13 See Heldt, supra note 7, at 6.  
14 According to a private conversation with a high-level diplomat who 
was involved in Balkans peacemaking, this lack of coordination or even 
competition was a huge problem for peacemaking in the Balkans. There is a large 
debate as to the merits of sequencing peacemaking tools and negotiation issues: 
how sequencing should be carried out, what tools to use, what issues to deal with 
and in what order. See Heldt, supra note 7 (providing a brief literature overview). 
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“other issues,” and over time move towards the more difficult or 
core matters instead of moving back and forth again and again.15 This 
disorder and plethora of peacemaking attempts makes it difficult to 
understand how one peacemaking attempt can build on previous 
attempts, or even how the conflict actors themselves can keep up 
with the process. This is especially because peacemaking attempts 
have different start dates, and sometimes overlap. It is not 
implausible that this peacemaking pattern prolonged the conflict, 
which in the end was solved on the battlefield instead of through 
negotiations.  
Other extreme cases for the period of 1993-2004 involving 
many third-parties and different mediation tools include: Burundi 
(late 1997-2003), Croatia (1995), Guinea Bissau (1998), 
Israel/Palestine (2000-2002), and the Ivory Coast (2002-2003).16 It is 
possible to find examples of peacemaking, where the application of 
third-party tools and issues does not appear chaotic or inconsistent, 
even though there are many peacemaking attempts; however, such 
cases are rare. 
An inherent feature of such uncoordinated peacemaking 
processes is not simply a lack of institutional memory and 
consistency, but also an absence of learning. Third-party initiated 
peacemaking should, in theory, move the process forward by 
softening the parties, increasing mutual trust and negotiating skills, 
and providing information on fundamental issues that make parties 
more likely to spot zones of agreements.17 Third parties also stand to 
learn from the process. However, since third parties change and are 
numerous in some cases, learning does not appear feasible: third 
parties usually do not engage for an extended period of time, and 
their lessons learned are not transferred to succeeding or competing 
third parties through debriefings. This may partly explain the lack of 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 Heldt, supra note 7, at 7. 
17 See generally Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There a 
Method in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of 
Mediation, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 329, 330 (2006); J. Michael Greig & Paul F. 
Diehl, Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy, 32 INT’L 
INTERACTIONS 355, 377-378 (2006); Heldt, supra note 7, at 8. 
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peacemaking consistency and continuity in some cases, and the 
general lack of progress. It also illustrates how potentially damaging 
the lack of long-term engagement by lead peacemakers can be in 
individual cases. 
TOWARDS MORE COORDINATION, 
AND MORE PEACEMAKING 
Just as scholars and practitioners think in terms of the steps 
to war, it may be useful to apply a similar concept and think in terms 
of steps to peace. Steps to peace “implies that early efforts may, or 
perhaps even should, fail to generate a breakthrough, but they will 
[ideally] inch the process forward, in a productive way such that the 
next mediation attempt can build upon” earlier efforts.18 It implies 
also that quick breakthroughs—or rapid progress—will be the 
exception rather than the rule, and thus will be time-consuming. 
Meanwhile, during the period 1993-2004, about one third of the 
emerging conflicts escalated to war, and all but five of the cases 
escalating did so within two calendar years.19 The same data also 
shows that if a conflict avoids escalation in the immediate term, it is 
unlikely it will escalate in the future. This pattern may be due to the 
most war-prone cases escalating right away, thereby leaving the less 
war-prone cases behind; or that peacemaking efforts start to bite—or 
are perhaps usually only initiated—after some period of time. 
However, since low-level conflicts that escalate to war almost always 
do so within a 24-month period, time is of the essence. There is no 
time for many cumulative peacemaking attempts or steps to peace, 
not least since peacemaking attempts require time-consuming 
preparations. Coordination must ideally be at hand from the very 
beginning. 
Strategic coordination tools such as ad hoc Groups of 
Friends, contact groups, friends of a country, and implementation 
                                                 
18 Heldt, supra note 7, at 2, 3, 9; Scott Sigmund Gartner, Civil War 
Peacemaking, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 2012: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF ARMED 
CONFLICTS, SELF-DETERMINATION MOVEMENTS, AND DEMOCRACY 71, 83 (J. 
Joseph Hewitt et al. eds., 2012). 
19 For data see Lotta Harbom, States in Armed Conflict 2006, in UPPSALA 
UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF PEACE AND RESEARCH REPORT 79 (2007). 
 2013 Heldt 2:1 
15 
group approaches, have different strengths and weaknesses.20 They 
emerged as novel strategic level peacemaking coordination 
mechanisms in the early 1990s and are now widely used with the goal 
of achieving strategic level coherence and coordination of 
peacemaking in protracted armed conflicts. The focus in this article 
is, however, on emerging cases, where coordination mechanisms such 
as Groups of Friends are rarely used, probably because emerging 
intrastate conflicts do not elicit much international interest. It may 
therefore be necessary to consider other solutions which involve a 
system or template for coordination that will not only work from the 
very first day of an emerging conflict, but also makes peacemaking 
more prevalent. 
One policy implication is that policymakers need to have a 
long-term strategy to address the coordination problem, part of 
which is to limit the number of peacemakers in a given conflict. A 
second policy implication is not to let initial failures (or non-
successes) discourage further peacemaking. Policymakers need to 
have a long-term view of the process, and carry out the process in a 
strategic manner. To paraphrase Sheri Rosenberg,21 peacemaking is a 
process, not an event. Unsuccessful initial mediations build a 
foundation for subsequent peacemaking attempts. Research suggests 
that it is not sufficient to simply do the right thing; it has to be done 
in a certain order, and repeatedly. One far-reaching vision involves 
not only the creation of a predetermined division of labor, but 
preferably also a predetermined third party that (with the support of 
the international community) takes the overall responsibility for an 
individual emerging conflict. The U.N. and some IGOs appear to be 
the only viable and legitimate actors to assume such regional or sub-
regional responsibilities. Admittedly, such ideal planning would in 
practice be difficult to achieve in some regions and sub-regions of the 
world (especially in Africa and Asia) because of (sub-) regional 
rivalries and unresolved disputes, and because of vested interests in 
                                                 
20 See generally Prantl, supra note 1; TERESA WHITFIELD, EXTERNAL 
ACTORS IN MEDIATION: DILEMMAS & OPTIONS FOR MEDIATORS 18 (2010); 
WHITFIELD, supra note 12; Whitfield, supra note 10, at 20-21; TERESA WHITFIELD, 
WORKING WITH GROUPS OF FRIENDS (2010). 
21 Sheri R. Rosenberg, Genocide is a Process, Not an Event, 7 GENOCIDE 
STUD. & PREVENTION 16 (2012). 
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the conflicts among some countries. Moreover, this approach would 
invalidate anything but so-called Track 1 diplomacy, which involves 
official government figures, and thus involves a return to the pattern 
of the centralised peacemaking that existed before the 1990s. At the 
same time this approach would increase the number of overall 
peacemaking attempts. In short, the approach involves fewer but 
more coordinated actors, not less peacemaking. The present pattern 
of peacemaking does not appear to be productive; a change is 
necessary. 
The international community, under the leadership of the 
U.N., has achieved a high degree of coordination in the areas of 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding, so there may already be templates 
for how to improve coordination in the area of peacemaking. 
However, peacekeeping is easier to coordinate. Given the high costs 
and manpower required, there are fewer potential peacekeeping 
actors. There is moreover no competition or out-bidding among 
these potential actors, and in those cases where several actors carry 
out peacekeeping simultaneously (e.g., Kosovo), there is close 
coordination and a clear division of labor. Peacemaking is the exact 
opposite of this scenario and a need exists to develop new methods 
to deal with this issue. 
A further policy implication is that efforts to improve 
coordination should not crowd out the fact that most emerging 
conflicts are left totally or partially “orphaned,” in that there are no 
or few outside peacemaking attempts.22 Only a handful of cases 
suffer from over-attention. Efforts to improve coordination should 
thus not lose sight of the need for more peacemaking, which in fact 
may be a bigger problem than the lack of coordination in a few select 
cases.  
On a final policy note, regardless of which is the most 
pressing issue, they all may be closely linked, in that closer attention 
to coordination issues may serve to strengthen the culture of 
prevention and peacemaking. A synergy effect may thus be at hand. 
                                                 
22 Fen O. Hampson, Preventive Diplomacy at the United Nations and Beyond, in 
FROM REACTION TO CONFLICT PREVENTION: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UN 
SYSTEM 139, 148-152 (Fen O. Hampson & David Malone eds., 1996). 
